Mapping the Career Preferences of Russian Law Graduates
by Kathryn Hendley

In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of people studying law in Russia and in the prestige of legal careers (Vozneseskaia 2015, p. 140). In the latter years of the Soviet era, less than 2 percent of the students pursuing higher education were studying law (Narodnoe 1987, pp. 544-45). By 2012, this percentage had increased five-fold (Moiseeva 2016, p. 7). The number of institutions offering legal education grew apace, increasing from about 50 in the 1980s (Finder 1989, p. 205) to about 1200 in 2017 (Maleshin 2017, p. 297). This growth in demand for legal education was driven in large part by the introduction of the market, which created a wealth of new opportunities for those with legal training. The economic transition freed up the labor market which brought an end to the practice of forcing university graduates into jobs that served the needs of the national economic plan. The end of this mandatory “distribution” or raspredelenie allowed young people to make their own career decisions. Yet we know remarkably little about the initial career choices of Russian law graduates. In this article, I explore this question by analyzing the results of a survey of 2016 graduates drawn from across Russia in which respondents were asked about their likely career paths. I am interested in what factors tend to be associated with the various choices and how these vary depending on whether the respondent studied law on full-time basis (“full-time students”) or by correspondence (“correspondence students”).

Like most European countries, Russia has a divided bar. There is no single organization akin to the American Bar Association which all law graduates are eligible to join. Indeed, even the label for those with legal education is problematic. Rather than describing themselves as “lawyers” or “iuristy,” Russians who work in the legal field tend to identify with their specialties. Thus they would describe themselves, for example, as a litigator (advokat), a prosecutor (prokuror), a criminal investigator (sledovatel’), a notary (notarius), or an in-house counsel (iuriskonsul’t) rather than as a iurist. As I discuss below, each specialty comes with its own history and institutional baggage. For the purposes of this article, I will use iurist or lawyer only when speaking generically of those with legal education.

I begin with an overview of the survey, focusing on who was included and why. Before delving into the respondents’ initial career choices, I lay out the available options and provide a

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2The market for legal services in Russia doubled in size between 2003 and 2015 (Moiseeva and Shugarevskii 2016).
capsule historical summery of how the various legal specialties open to contemporary Russian law graduates came into being and their evolution during the Soviet era and the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The bulk of the article is devoted to an analysis of the key factors that influence the respondents’ career paths, including educational background, gender, and attitudes towards the Russian courts. The goal is not to build a predictive model, but to begin a conversation about how Russian law graduates choose their initial jobs. My hope is to field regular surveys of these respondents in the future to track how they go about building their careers.

Methodology

The existing scholarly literature on the Russian legal profession, which is voluminous, tends to bore in on the individual specialties.\textsuperscript{3} My approach is different. By surveying law students on the cusp of graduation, I am able to get access to all potential career tracks. This provides an unprecedented opportunity to assess the factors – both demographic and attitudinal – that are associated with the initial career choices of Russian law graduates.

Interviewers recruited by my Russian colleagues fanned out across Russia in the late spring of 2016 to talk with 2,176 prospective graduates from 163 law departments or fakul’tety.\textsuperscript{4} Two independent representative samples were created: one for full-time students and a second for correspondence students. This was deemed necessary because, as Table 1 documents, the profiles of these two types of students are remarkably different (Hendley draft). Among my respondents, 1,557 were full-time students and 619 were correspondence students. The samples were constructed using fakul’tety as the initial unit of analysis. They were stratified based on whether they were public or private and, then again, by level of prestige. The samples of

\textsuperscript{3}There is a robust literature on advokaty, dating back to the Tsarist era (e.g., Pomernanz 1996; Kucherov 1953), continuing through the Soviet era (e.g., Huskey 1986) and the post-Soviet era (e.g., Bocharov & Moiseeva 2016; Jordan 2005). These are the most visible of all iuristy, explaining their popularity among Russian and foreign scholars. Prokurory are less open to scholarly entreaties, but have nonetheless been the subject of several monographs (e.g., Smith 1978). Other parts of the criminal justice system have only recently begun to be studied (e.g., Titaev & Shkliaruk 2016). Shelley (1984) studied iuriskonsul’ty by interviewing emigres. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that scholars were able to study them in situ (e.g., Hendley 2010). Judges have likewise been more accessible in the post-Soviet era (e.g., Volkov et al. 2016; Hendley 2007), though efforts were made to understand them in the Soviet (e.g., Ginsburgs 1985) and the Tsarist eras (e.g., Kucherov 1953).

\textsuperscript{4}The names for institutions where law can be studied in Russia vary. If they are part of a larger university, then they are typically referred to as the “law department” or iuridicheskii fakul’tet. There are also some stand-alone institutions that focus solely on legal education. They may be called institutes or academies. For ease, I use the more general term “fakul’tet” throughout this article.
respondents were distributed in proportion to the number of 2016 graduates. When on site at the selected law fakul'tety, interviewers used snowball methods to gather respondents.

Correspondence or zaochnoe education is an extreme version of what we know as distance learning. It evolved in the early 20th century when the available technology did not allow remote connections between students and their teachers. Those enrolled in zaochnye programs, known colloquially as zaochniki, are responsible for mastering the substantive content of courses on their own. At the beginning of each semester, they receive brochures, known as metodicheskiye rekomendatsii, with recommendations about source materials and review questions. They are required to produce essays that demonstrate their knowledge. They gather two times a year for about three weeks, during which they take a battery of exams and attend lectures highlighting the subjects to be studied during the next semester. Students may take the correspondence route because their family or work commitments leave them without enough time to take regularly scheduled classes or because they lack the money to pay full-time tuition.

Zaochnoe education is a carryover from the Soviet era. When the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered a rapid increase in the number of lawyers in 1946, this was achieved largely through correspondence education. By 1949, 64 percent of all law students were zaochniki (Solomon 1996, pp. 341-43). The data for the decades that follow are not broken down by department. The percentage of zaochniki among all those attending institutions of higher education was 35 percent by the mid-1980s (Narodnoe 1987, p. 544). The expansion of market-based educational opportunities in the 1990s, combined with newly available web-based resources, which made access to course materials easier, gave rise to a massive increase in the numbers of students pursuing zaochnoe education. It was a boon for smaller schools, allowing them to admit many more students than they could physically accommodate. Legal educational institutions were quick to jump on the bandwagon. By 2016, upwards of 70 percent of all law students were opting for correspondence education (Moiseeva 2016, p. 17). Qualms about the quality of zaochnye programs and the competence of its graduates persist from the Soviet era (Solomon 1996, pp. 346-47) to the present day (Moiseeva 2015).

Despite the fact that zaochniki outnumber full-time students, locating them was not easy because they do not maintain a permanent presence at law fakul'tety. The interviewers had to time their visits to coincide with the periods when the correspondence students were physically present.

Respondents – both full-time and correspondence students – were asked the same battery of questions. Topics ranged from their demographic and family background to their work history to their attitudes towards various legal and institutions. Respondents’ willingness to respond varied depending on the sensitivity of the underlying question. For ordinary questions, few (less than 2 percent) respondents refused to respond. When it came to questions with political overtones, however, avoidance was more common. The refusal rate for such questions was around 15 percent.
Table 1 provides an overview of the two samples. The gender split among both groups was similar; women constituted over 60 percent. Likewise, ethnic Russians constituted the vast majority of both samples. This dominance was more complete among correspondence students (90 percent) than among full-time students (74 percent). Zaochniki were also more likely to be Russian Orthodox.

The two groups of students tended to come from different family backgrounds. Correspondence students had fewer financial advantages. They were more likely to have roots in the lower middle class or in poverty. Few were free of financial worries. Their chances of growing up with parents who completed university was markedly less than their full-time colleagues. A majority were returning to school after time in the workforce and were shouldering the cost of their education themselves. As a result, they were an older cohort and were more likely to be married and to have children.\(^5\) They were less likely to live in Moscow or St. Petersburg.

By contrast, full-time students tended to come from families who are financially comfortable. Almost all of them matriculated directly from high school. Few paid their own way, relying instead on their parents or on state stipends. They were more likely to have well-educated parents who likely inculcated them with the expectation that they would attend university. It follows that their chances of attending a higher-prestige state law fakul’tet (rather than a private fakul’tet) was substantially greater than are those for zaochniki.

**Legal Specialties Available to Russian Law Graduates: Mapping the Institutional Landscape**

During the Soviet era, law graduates had little control over their initial jobs. As part of the national plan, they were sent where needed and were required to remain there for at least three years (Rand 1991; Finder 1989).\(^6\) Well-connected graduates and their parents often tried to

\(^5\)The percentage of respondents with children was 39 for zaochniki and 3 for full-time students.

\(^6\)In part one of his 2017 interviews with Oliver Stone, Vladimir Putin explained that his job with the KGB, which he received upon graduation from the law fakul’tet of Leningrad State University, was the result of this raspredelenie. He went on to note that working for the KGB had long been his dream. Not everyone was so fortunate to obtain their first-choice job. According to Shelley (1984, p. 23), “[i]nitial job assignments [were] often in remote and undesirable areas where the individual [was] required to stay for three years before returning home.” Along similar lines, Solomon (1996, p. 348) reports mistreatment by regional authorities of graduates sent to the hinterlands to work in criminal justice.
use their networks to avoid assignments to remote areas of Russia as part of this raspredelenie.\textsuperscript{7} With the advent of an unregulated labor market beginning in the mid-1980s, graduates were no longer subject to the raspredelenie. Instead, like students elsewhere, they were responsible for finding their own jobs.

Respondents were asked what sort of legal specialty they planned to pursue after graduation. Table 2 lays out the results for each sample. Making sense of the table requires a few words of background about the options. Most are carryovers from the Soviet era, but few have made the transition into the post-Soviet period without key changes. Corporate lawyers were absent from the Soviet legal landscape, but have become an integral part of the story with the development of the market in Russia.

**Advokaty.** As to the private bar, Russia was a late developer. The emergence of legal specialists who represented private individuals and firms came only in 1864 as part of the larger reform of legal institutions in tsarist Russia (Huskey 1986). These specialists became known as advokaty. Their primary function was to represent the accused in criminal cases, but their competence also extended to giving general legal advice, drafting documents, and representing clients in civil cases. They enjoyed considerable prestige in the late 19th century. The speeches of prominent advokaty defending notorious clients in criminal trials were bestsellers (Butler 2011; Kucharov 1953). On the other hand, as Michael Newcity (2005, p. 280) notes, while advokaty grew to be a “potent political force” in Russian politics of the late tsarist period, they never had the prominence or political significance of their counterparts in England or the United States.

Advokaty had a rockier ride during the Soviet period (Huskey 1986; Friedman & Zile 1964). Initially, following the October Revolution that brought the Communist Party to power in 1917, their very existence was threatened by the contempt that Lenin, a former advokat himself, had for his fellow advokaty (Burbank 1995). But eventually the Soviet regime came to recognize the need for advokaty, though the independence from state control that is inherent in the attorney-client relationship was always viewed with suspicion by the authorities (Mrowczynski 2016, p. 163). Advokaty were paid by their clients, whereas law graduates who worked in other specialties were paid by the state. Advokaty were organized into colleges (kollegii) by locale. The leaders of each kollegii controlled admission, though the state set limits on the total number of new advokaty. The state imposed its control over their activities by regulating the fees they could charge clients and mandating that they provide free legal advice on a variety of issues.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7}See Ledeneva (1988) for an analysis of the role of connections as a coping mechanism in the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{8}Of the 7 million oral consultations advokaty provided in 1981, 6 million were provided at no cost to the client (Pipko & Pipko 1987, p. 869). For most of the Soviet era, the fees stipulated by the state were viewed by all as insufficient. Fees were routinely supplemented by under-the-table payments. Though such payments were illegal and opened advokaty to
The perverse result was that Soviet advokaty had to maintain a large caseload in order to be able to support their families. This also helps explain why the number of advokaty remained low throughout the life of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the number of advokaty in Russia was 2.5 times lower in 1986 than it was in 1913, before the advent of the Soviet Union (Jordan 2005, p. 53).

As this suggests, the popularity of becoming an advokat waxed and waned. As Dina Kaminskaya (1982, p. 12) wrote in her memoir of life as a Soviet advokat, few of her fellow students in the late 1930s were interested in this path due to the “abysmally low” status of advokaty. In his ethnography of the Soviet courts of the 1960s, George Feifer (1964, p. 245) contends that law students viewed advokaty as “superfluous.” By the mid-1980s, when Ekaterina Mishina was graduating from Moscow State University’s law fakul’tet, attitudes had changed. She reports that she and many of her classmates were keen to become advokaty (2010, p. 9).

No doubt the collapse of state regulation over advokaty as a consequence of the reform efforts led by Gorbachev beginning in 1985 played a role in popularizing this specialty. Their numbers in Russia grew dramatically, increasing from 12,550 in 1983 (Burrage 1990, p. 434, n. 1) to 23,400 in 1995 (Prestupnost’ 2003, p. 60). By 2001, their numbers had more than doubled to 47,300 (ibid.) and, by 2014, there were 70,414 advokaty (Otchet 2015). But this robust growth masks the real story for it was during the Gorbachev era that advokaty began to face their first real competition. No longer did the kollegii serve as the gatekeepers to becoming an advokat. What became known as “parallel colleges” popped up (Jordan 2005). Their standards were much looser. Indeed, according to some reports, these parallel colleges accepted law students within their ranks, greatly angering member of the traditional kollegii (Petrukhin 1997, p. 31).

The unraveling of the prerogatives of the traditional kollegii accelerated with the full embrace of the market by Yeltsin following the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. The regulatory free-for-all that characterized the Russian transition extended to the labor market for legal specialists. Anyone was free to hang out a shingle. The monopoly that advokaty had always enjoyed over the representation of clients in court was regularly flouted with no consequences. Leaders among the advokaty attempted to reestablish it in 2002 with the passage of a law on the bar (advokatura) (Federal’nyi 2002). When interlopers challenged the provision granting advokaty the exclusive right to represent clients in court, the Russian Constitutional Court struck it down, pointing to the language of the constitution which gives citizens an unfettered right to select their own counsel. At the end of the day, advokaty retained only the monopoly to represent the accused in criminal proceedings (Opredelenie 2003). Indeed, in a 2005 survey and follow-up focus groups, most participants associated advokaty with representing criminal defendants (Vovk 2006).

Non-Advokat Litigators. Beginning in the late 1980s, law facul’tet graduates who did not bother to become advokaty began to represent private citizens and firms. Like advokaty, these prosecution and disbarment, few advokaty refused them. In 1988, the allowable fees were increased and this practice of taking side payments disappeared (Rand 1991, pp. 12-14).
law graduates represented clients in court, offered them legal advice, and drafted legal documents. In theory, they were in competition with advokaty. In reality, these newcomers tended to shy away from criminal cases, ceding those to advokaty. Instead, they concentrated on serving the needs of newly privatized businesses, which were struggling to cope with the demands of the market. The immediate post-privatization period was characterized by high levels of inter-enterprise arrears (Ickes & Ryterman 1992). Managers were accustomed to having the state make up their shortfalls; the requirement to balance their books – to collect the amounts owed to them and to pay their own debts – was foreign to them (Hendley et al. 2000). These new entrants to private legal practice, many of whom had previously worked as in-house counsel, were well-positioned to fill this new niche. They developed expertise in practicing in the newly created economic or arbitrazh courts. Advokaty, by contrast, initially gave short shrift to mastering the procedural rules of the arbitrazh courts. They failed to see the financial potential of representing businesses. In the Soviet era, many of them had moonlighted as representatives of state enterprises that were too small to merit their own full-time iuriskonsul’t. They regarded this work as tedious and were paid a pittance for it. They were happy to leave the business world to these non-advokaty. By the time advokaty woke up to fact that business clients could yield tremendous profits for them, it was too late.

As I noted earlier, advokaty tried to regain their institutional advantage through the 2002 law. One of their goals was to bring these unregulated law graduates into the fold. Perhaps if the monopoly over court practice for advokaty had held up, their plan would have worked. Even when it was scaled back to criminal work, many thought that the exclusion of these non-advokaty would spur them to join advokatskie kollegii, given that they had begun to represent criminal defendants in the interim. But it did not. As Timur Bocharov and Ekaterina Moiseeva argue in their monograph on advokaty: “Iuristy without the status of advokaty do not feel that obtaining such status will give them solid economic advantages” (2016, p. 40). They are reluctant to pay the fees associated with becoming an advokat and to subject themselves to the ongoing obligations attached to being an advokat, which include providing free legal advice to needy citizens and living up to ethical rules. Advokaty, unsurprisingly, are annoyed by what they see as the low ethical standards of non-advokaty litigators (Moiseeva & Shugarevskii 2016, pp. 7-8).

To this end, non-advokaty litigators are free to hit the ground running upon graduation. Some may join law firms that have internal training programs, but nothing beyond a law degree is required under law, so long as they steer clear of criminal cases. By contrast, prospective advokaty are required by law to go through a structured two-year apprenticeship, supervised by licensed advokaty (art. 9, Federal’nyi 2002; Butler 2011, p. 113). If, at the conclusion of that

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*Pravo.ru conducted an informal poll on why efforts to restore the monopoly of advokaty over court practice has been unsuccessful. The results were divided among six reasons: the poor quality of their lobbyists (22 percent), the decision is in the hands of judges (19 percent), advokaty do not want to take on additional work (17 percent), some advokaty oppose greater commercialization (17 percent), advokaty have not proven their ability to manage this work (10 percent), and other (15 percent) (“Pochemu” n.d.).
period, they remain committed, then they can apply for membership. This requires them to pass an exam and to agree to live up to the ethical standards for advokaty. The passage rate for applicants hovered around 70 percent between 2009 and 2015 (Otchet 2015).

These non-advokaty litigators have remained largely elusive to researchers because they belong to no single association. Scholars of the Russian legal profession estimate that their numbers exceed 100,000 (ibid.). My survey offers a first window into who they are.

Prokurory. Turning now to the staffing of the criminal justice system, prokurory have a much longer history than advokaty. They were introduced in the 18th century by Peter the Great. Though often rendered in English as prosecutors, their functions are broader. In addition to representing the interests of the state in criminal cases, like prosecutors elsewhere, prokurory are also charged with ensuring justice throughout the legal system. They were expected to act as the “eye of the tsar” (Smith 1978). Writing in 1968, Donald Barry and Harold Berman argued: “[t]he procuracy [the totality of prokurory] is the cornerstone of the Soviet legal profession. It probably contains abler people than any other branch, and it has higher responsibilities” (p. 24). In his monograph on the procuracy, Gordon Smith estimated that there were about 15,000 prokurory in the Soviet Union in 1973 (1978, p. 23).

The reputation of prokurory for competence and ferocity continued into the post-Soviet era. Mishina (2010, p. 10) describes them as “the most formidable [grozyne] of all iuristy.” Their numbers have expanded dramatically. By the end of 2016, there were over 51,000 prokurory in Russia (Ukaz 2016).

Criminal Investigators (Sledovateli). The origins of criminal investigators or sledovateli, like advokaty, date back to the Great Reforms of 1864 (Titaev and Shkliaruk 2016). They work together with the police to identify suspects and with prokurory to ensure their conviction. Because few of those accused are able to escape conviction in the Russian system, the power to point the finger, which lies primarily with sledovateli, takes on critical importance. Unlike prokurory, who work within a bureaucratic hierarchy headed by the General Procurator, investigators can be found within a number of departments, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee. Because they are spread out across the criminal justice system, determining the total number of investigators is difficult. As of 2012, the staff of the Investigative Committee, the bulk of whom are sledovateli, numbered almost 20,000 (Ukaz 2011).

Careers within the Criminal Justice System, But Not as Prokurory or Sledovanteli. Many Russian law grads take jobs within the criminal justice system other than as prosecutors or investigators. In the survey, I deliberately left this open-ended. The most obvious option would be as a policeman, though a law degree is certainly not mandatory for all such jobs. The police underwent a reform and reorganization in 2011, which was aimed at encouraging the police to be more community oriented and to protect civil rights. As part of the reform, their label was changed from militsiia to politsiia. Many commentators felt that the reforms were simply
window dressing (e.g., Razin 2014). The public agreed. In a 2013 survey fielded by the Levada Center, a reputable Russian polling firm, 55 percent of respondents saw no positive changes from the reforms. Only 40 percent of those surveyed said they trusted the police (Vorontsova 2014).

*Iuriskonsul'ty*. The transition from state socialism to the market brought profound changes to the job profile of in-house counsel in Russia. During the Soviet era, when the means of production were controlled by the state, these *iuriskonsul’ty* were state employees. Like other employees of state enterprises, their primary goal was to ensure that their factory fulfilled the production quotas set by the annual economic plan. This might require them to negotiate with suppliers to ensure a constant flow of raw materials. In extreme cases, they might take delinquent suppliers to state *arbitrazh*, the administrative agency charged with resolving disputes among state enterprises (Pomorski 1977). In doing so, they were less interested in seeking monetary damages than in laying the blame for any production shortfalls elsewhere. Rather, it was a signaling device for their bureaucratic superiors (Kroll 1987). These *iuriskonsul’ty* also handled personnel questions, which sometimes landed them in the courts of general jurisdiction. But large enterprises had an internal mechanism for dealing with dissatisfied workers, making lawsuits unusual (Hendley 1996). Rather than seeing *iuriskonsul’ty* as adversaries—as part of management—workers tended to go to them with their personal legal problems. Louise Shelley’s (1984) monograph on *iuriskonsul’ty* suggests that some were more helpful than others.

The few analyses of Soviet *iuriskonsul’ty* emphasize both the lack of prestige of this position and their large numbers, estimated to be well in excess of the number of *advokaty* (Burrage 1990). Because there was no organization to which in-house counsel belonged, we cannot know precisely how many there were. Notwithstanding their numbers, analysts agree that there were not enough *iuriskonsul’ty* to serve all state enterprises (Shelley 1984, pp. 54-55). When factories that were too small to be allocated a *iuriskonsul’t* encountered legal problems, they tended to hire *advokaty* to fill the gap (Barry & Berman 1968, p. 18).

Privatization launched enterprises into a new legal landscape in which profits were king and the need for plan fulfillment was a distant memory. Management worried more about customers’ non-payment than suppliers’ non-delivery. The end of the command economy meant that they could seek substitute inputs on the open market. For *iuriskonsul’ty*, this meant that negotiations and, in extreme cases, lawsuits were supposed to yield monetary damages (Hendley


\[11\]Shelley (1984, p. 24) reports that becoming a *iuriskonsul’t* was not the first career choice for any of her respondents. Rather it was “instead a legal specialty they were forced to enter as a result of their nationality or their subordination to their husband’s career.” Later in her monograph, she captures the lack of value placed on *iuriskonsul’ty* by noting that “[i]f an organization had to cut its staff, the *iuriskonsul’t* and the cleaning woman would be the first to go” (p. 46).
2010). Many became accustomed to seeking debt repayment through the economic or arbitrazh courts (Hendley et al. 1999). But what did not change was the status of the iuriskonsul’t within the enterprise. Much as in the Soviet era, iuriskonsul’ty tended to be peripheral figures (Hendley et al. 2001). Illustrating this point, iuriskonsul’ty were generally not key players in the privatization process.

As I noted earlier, with the relaxation of the norms governing representation of clients in court in the late 1980s, many iuriskonsul’ty jumped ship and opened general practices of their own. Unfortunately, this process was not documented at the time, making it impossible to know the exact numbers. But observers suspect that relatively few of these former iuriskonsul’ty bothered to jump through the hoops necessary to become advokaty.

**Corporate Lawyers.** Corporate lawyers who focus on transactional law were superfluous in the planned economy of the Soviet era. Even now, they are not common. In a series of focus groups that included a cross section of different legal specialists carried out more than a decade ago, I found that most participants had no idea what was meant by transactional work. They mostly saw their role as representing private clients in court. There were, of course, exceptions. A number of major U.S. and European law firms have opened offices in Moscow and St. Petersburg to serve their clients who took advantage of the opening of the Russian market to foreign firms. Russian law firms have arisen to compete with them. Corporate lawyers, both Russian and foreign, abound in these firms.

I assumed that at least some young people aspiring to a career in law in Russia were aware of this specialty. In drafting the survey, we struggled to come up with a Russian term that would capture this option. After much debate, we framed it somewhat awkwardly as a “lawyer-contract specialist (handling transactions, contracts)” (iurist-dogovornik (oformlenie sdelok, dogovorov)). Needless to say, no one has previously put these legal specialists under a microscope.

**Lawyers in the State Bureaucracy.** Law graduates who go to work for some state agency or institution that is not part of the criminal justice or judicial systems have also largely escaped scrutiny. Yet we know that the state – both in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras – soak up large numbers of legally-trained specialists. Once again, the total numbers are unknown.

**Judges.** We know more about judges than about faceless bureaucrats. Like other countries with civil law legal traditions, Russian judges have always seen themselves as civil servants, not as policy makers. During the Soviet period, their loyalty to the tenets of the Communist Party was a better predictor of selection and endurance than competence. Soviet judges were elected for five-year terms, albeit in single-candidate elections for which the candidates were carefully vetted by the Party. Party membership was an informal but inescapable prerequisite for the bench. Any judge who deviated from the Party line risked being dumped as a candidate (Ginsburgs 1985).
Reforms to the judicial selection system began under Gorbachev and continued under Yeltsin (Solomon and Foglesong 2000). Ultimately, Russia followed the European model and created commissions to which those aspiring to the bench could apply (Trochev 2006). Sitting judges dominate the membership of these commissions. Applicants must be graduates of law fakul’tety with at least five years experience, though relatively few come onto the bench with such minimal experience. According to large scale surveys of judges fielded by the Institute for the Rule of Law at European University in St. Petersburg from 2011 to 2013, the most common route to the judiciary is through the courthouse itself (Volkov et al. 2016; Volkov & Dzmitryieva 2015). Almost 30 percent of the surveyed judges had worked as clerks (pomoshchniki) or secretaries to sitting judges before ascending to the bench. Around 20 percent of judges had formerly been prokurory, and another 15 percent had worked in other capacities within the criminal justice system (Volkov & Dzmitryieva 2015, p. 172). Becoming a judge after working as a private lawyer – either an advokat or a iuriskonsul’t – was less likely (Volkov & Dzmitryieva 2015; Mishina 2010).

The number of courts and, consequently, the number of judges has increased dramatically in the post-Soviet era. Barry and Berman (1968, p. 21) estimated that there were 9,000 judges in the Soviet Union in 1965. By 1985, George Ginsburgs reckoned that the number had increased to 11,000 (p. 307). By 1990, there were almost 17,000 Soviet judges (Narodnoe 1991). It might seem that these numbers would decrease as we shift our focus from the entire Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. But the 1990s witnessed the creation of new courts for post-Soviet Russia, including the constitutional court, the arbitrazh courts, and the justice-of-the-peace courts (JP courts). Writing in 2015, Vadim Volkov and Aryna Dzmitryieva pegged the number of Russian judges at 34,000, which they said represented a four-fold increase since 1999 (p. 167). This explosion is probably due to the creation of the JP courts, which were authorized in 1998, and were rolled out across Russia over the following decade (Hendley 2012).

Notaries. European notaries have little in common with notaries in the U.S. In Russia, just as in the rest of continental Europe, becoming a notary requires a law degree. As Gisela Shaw (2009, p. 396) explains in her study of notaries in Poland and Hungary, “the raison d’eˆtre of notarial activities is still that of the Roman scribes: to enhance the security of legal transactions and therefore the trust of the parties involved.” During the Soviet period, notaries worked for the state. According to Mishina (2013), ending up with a job in a notary’s office after the raspredelenie or distribution of students that took place following graduation was the “least attractive” option. As she explains, “their situation was crystal clear and was characterized by nervous, high-pressure work with a very low salary and almost no opportunities for advancement. ... It is no surprise, then, that there were not many who aspired to work in a notary’s office.”

Mishina goes on to argue that, in the post-Soviet era, notaries experienced an

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12In their survey, Volkov et al. (2016, p. 171) found that the mean age for judges at the time of appointment was 34. On average, judges had 10.5 years of legal practice before coming to the bench.
“astonishing evolution” (ibid.). They are no longer state employees; their function has been privatized. Like *advokaty*, they work directly with individuals and firms to verify documents. Also like *advokaty*, notaries are licensed and belong to a national association. To become a notary, law graduates must complete a year-long apprenticeship and pass an entrance exam.

Societal attitudes toward this specialty have changed. Initially, private notaries were viewed with “suspicion” by ordinary Russians. Mishina argues that:

Being used to waiting in long lines in small public notaries’ offices and dealing with moody, overworked, and often-rude notaries, people thought that private notaries were too good to be true. Sitting in their beautiful and spacious offices, private notaries looked far better than their colleagues in public service: they treated their clients politely, and there were no lines in their offices (ibid.). By 2010, however, she concludes that “today it is possible to state with confidence that the profession of notary is one of the most respected in the legal sphere” (Mishina 2010, p. 13).

The number of state notaries in 1990 was 6,778 (Narodnoe 1991, p. 258). By 2011, when notaries had been reorganized as private actors for several decades they numbered almost 7,700 (Federal’naia 2012). My study represents the first effort to understand who these notaries are.¹³

**Explaining the Career Preferences of Graduating Russian Law Students**

Table 2 documents the respondents’ initial choices. Evaluating these data is complicated by the complete absence of information about how law graduates have distributed themselves among potential specialties since they have been empowered to make this decision themselves. Without comparative reference points, it is impossible to assess whether the figures reported in Table 2 are high or low. But there is no question that they are intriguing and create a baseline against which we can compare data from future surveys.

***Job Placement.*** In addition, Table 2 provides information about the relative success of respondents in securing jobs upon graduation. In Russia, as elsewhere, a bird in hand is always preferable and, therefore, this factor surely influenced their choice of specialty. The two samples diverge: more than half of all correspondence students had jobs, compared with about 30 percent of full-time students. No doubt many *zaochniki* were returning to the workplaces that had employed them while they attended the law *fakul’tet*. Among correspondence students, among the most likely to be employed were the “other” category of criminal justice workers that includes police officers.¹⁴ A startling three-quarters of this group reported having jobs. They are

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¹³Shaw (2009, p. 398) comments that “[s]ocio-legal field research on the profession of notaries is scrawny, generally speaking.” She finds the problem to be particularly acute in countries with a Communist history.

¹⁴Several of the categories with relatively small numbers of studies had atypical results. Non-*advokaty* litigators had the highest take-up rate at 75 percent, but numbered only 16, making
unique in that 58 percent had law-related jobs prior to matriculating (compared to 24 percent for the full sample of correspondence students). The average age of this group at 31 marks them as significantly older and probably eager to move onward and upward in their careers. Those who hoped to eventually end up on the bench had a better-than-average chance of having secured a spot in a judge’s chambers. On the other hand, aspiring prokurory and notaries were notably less likely to have found a place for themselves.

Among full-time students, the variation in placement rates is less extreme. Much as for zaochniki, those who hoped to become judges, investigators, and police officials tended to have found jobs. Aspiring prokurory and notaries were less fortunate. As to those who wanted to be advokaty, full-time students had a much greater chance of having secured a position than did correspondence students. Perhaps this is because full-time students were twice as likely to have worked in the offices of advokaty during their years at the law fakul’tet.

These practical considerations of having landed a job are only one factor. The remainder of the article is devoted to exploring other qualities associated with the career choices laid out in Table 2. I begin by looking at interplay between such choices and the educational paths taken by the respondents. I then turn to the role of gender and conclude by exploring their attitudes towards the legal system.

Educational Path. The chaotic nature of the Russian legal education landscape since the late 1980s creates a quandary for many prospective students. Not only do they have to decide whether to attend the law fakul’tet on a full-time basis or study law by correspondence, but they also have to make their way through a thicket of possible venues, both public and private. Tables 2 and 3 present information about the variation in educational choices for my respondents by legal specialty. Attributing causal connections to the educational paths taken by respondents and their subsequent career choices would be an overreach, but certain associational patterns emerge that are intriguing. Before discussing these results, a few words of background about legal education in Russia are needed to put these findings into context.

Legal education in Russia is an undergraduate enterprise. In the Soviet era, the 52 law fakul’tety state institutions; students paid no tuition. Demand consistently outpaced supply, with up to 40 applicants competing for each spot (Mishina 2013, p. 6). But studying law was not particularly popular. Many of those who graduated with law degrees never practiced law in any form. The Soviet period was marked by shortages of legal specialists, particularly in more remote rural regions (Jordan 2005; Huskey 1982; Hazard 1938).

As state control disintegrated in the late 1980s and the advent of the market brought generalizations hazardous.

15 Studying to become a teacher was 10 times more popular during this period (Narodnoe 1987, p. 545).
greater attention to law, entrepreneurs saw a market niche in legal education. New law *fakul'tety* proliferated. Not only did existing institutions of higher education open law *fakul'tety* but, for the first time, private law *fakul'tety* were created. By 1995, those interested in studying law had over 170 choices, of which 113 were public. By 1999, the number had risen to 295, of which 143 were public (Trochev 2000). By 2017, Dmitry Maleshin (2017, p. 297), the former vice-dean of the law *fakul'tet* at Moscow State University, which is widely viewed as the premier law *fakul'tet* in Russia (as it was in the Soviet Union), estimated this number to be 1,200. In his view, “The plethora of Russian law schools is the Achilles’ heel of Russian legal education” (ibid.). State accreditation is a formality. Many question the quality of the education being provided. Indeed, one Russian commentator estimated that “up to 80 percent of non-governmental and 30-40 percent of governmental institutions of higher education take money from students for a degree, but without giving them the necessary education” (Maggs et al, p. 185). Maleshin (2017) argues that market pressure will eventually drive these fly-by-night law *fakul'tety* from the market; that the law-student-consumers will turn away. But he concedes that, thus far, few have fallen by the wayside. In fact, it is the desperation and lack of discernment on the part of prospective students that has allowed them to flourish.

On the other hand, the explosion in law *fakul'tety* has greatly eased the pressure on applicants, whose numbers have skyrocketed. About half of all applicants are admitted somewhere (Moiseeva 2016, p. 8). In this new world, the goal is to obtain a “budget place” (*biudzhetnoe mesto*), for which no tuition is required. The competition for these spots, which are offered to less than 20 percent of all law students, almost all of whom attend state schools, remains intense (ibid., p. 8). Rumors of corruption persist, but are difficult to verify (Osipan 2012; Temple & Petrov 2004). The remaining 80 percent of law students are expected to pay tuition. This represents a huge shift in the Russian educational landscape, but is not unique to law students.

**Full-time versus Correspondence Study.** Whether the decision to study law full-time or via correspondence can fairly be framed as a choice is unclear. Unlike the full-time student cohort, most of whom are taking their first tentative steps toward adulthood by enrolling at a law *fakul'tet*, *zaochniki* have more constraints on their freedom of movement, both literally and figuratively. As the demographic data remind us, students who opt for *zaochnoe* education tend to come from families with fewer financial resources and less education. For the most part, they are older and tempered by the workplace. They may not have the luxury of devoting themselves entirely to their studies. If they want to pursue opportunities open only to those with law degrees, then the correspondence track may be their only alternative. Table 2 indicates that this fork in the road – full-time versus correspondence – influenced career paths upon graduation.

**Litigation Specialists.** An interest in litigation was more common for full-time students than for correspondence students, amounting to 14.3 percent of the former compared with 8.9 percent of the latter (see Table 2). Among this group, it is striking that, for both samples, more than twice as many were committed to becoming *advokaty* than were planning to take the easier road of representing clients in court without the benefit of any sort of
license. Moreover, the data suggest that these non-advokat litigators were not closing the door permanently on becoming advokaty. When asked whether they might take the advokatskii exam in the future, over 30 percent of this group said yes, which was well in excess of the results for other specialties.\textsuperscript{16} Whether this might portend the eventual demise of this amorphous category of non-advokat litigators is unclear. Leaders of the national organization for advokaty have long pushed for such an outcome, arguing that having different ethical standards for people who are doing exactly the same job in representing clients in courts is confusing for ordinary Russians and undermines the reputation of all litigation specialists ("Pochemu" n.d.; Bocharov & Moiseeva 2016; Pravitel'stvo 2013; Petrukhin 1997).

\textit{Criminal Justice Specialists.} Table 2 documents the strong interest of Russian law graduates in careers in the criminal justice system. Taken together, those who are committed to becoming prokurory, sledovateli, or other related jobs add up to about 28 percent of each sample. Moreover, as compared to others, hopeful prokurory and sledovateli were more committed to their career paths. Respondents were asked what job they wanted when they entered the law \textit{fakul’tet}. The correlation rate for career preferences at the beginning and end of their education was higher for these two criminal justice tracks than for other specialties. Almost half of those who came into the law \textit{fakul’tet} thinking of such careers stuck by their guns as opposed to about a third of those interested in litigation.\textsuperscript{17}

Although about the same percentage of both samples planned careers in criminal justice, precisely what type of job they wanted differed. As Table 2 shows, full-time students were attracted to the prokuratura whereas correspondence students saw their future in the less prestigious bowels of the system. Indeed, these two categories of prokuror and jobs in criminal justice other than prokuror or sledovatel’ are almost mirror images of one another. The percentages of the sample of full-time students were 10.9 and 4.6, respectively. For zaochniki, they were 3.1 and 12.5. This speaks to the pragmatism of the respondents and their recognition of the divergence in opportunities available.

\textit{ Judges.} Full-time students are more attracted to the bench. Almost 8 percent plan to work in the judicial system, compared with 5.4 percent of correspondence students. This is unexpected and reflects a shift away from recruiting new judges from...

\textsuperscript{16}The percentages for full-time and correspondence students who hoped to become generic litigators were 33 and 44 percent, respectively. As to the full samples, 24 percent of full-time students and 19 percent of correspondence students planned to take the exam to become advokaty in the future. Not surprisingly, these results were driven by aspiring advokaty, almost all of whom were planning to take the exam. By contrast, only about 10 percent of those heading into the criminal justice system had any interest in this exam.

\textsuperscript{17}For the third criminal justice career track that included police officers, the correlation rates between the two samples were remarkably different. Whereas almost half of the zaochniki maintained their preference, less than a third of full-time students did.
Surveys of judges show that over half those who came to the bench between 2001 to 2008 had law degrees earned through correspondence study. But for those who became judges after 2009, a clear majority had been full-time students (Volkov et al. 2015, p. 86). This change not only reflected a desire for judges with better training, but was also a natural consequence of a requiring that judicial assistants (pomoshchniki) have law degrees as a prerequisite for the job. The previous policy had allowed pomoshchniki to study law via correspondence while working for the courts (Petrova 2012).

As I noted earlier, new graduates cannot go directly onto the bench. Their law degree qualifies them to work as pomoshchniki. Their precise duties depends on the needs of individual judges. My prior field work in Russian courts suggests that pomoshchniki often draft court orders and opinions, though such documents can only be promulgated after being reviewed and signed by judges (Hendley 2017; 2013). They rarely attend or otherwise participate in court hearings. Many have an ultimate career goal of becoming judges themselves and tolerate low salaries while working as pomoshchniki until they have at least five years of legal experience which is the minimum required to be a judge (Volkov and Dzmitryeva 2015, p. 176). For both samples, over 40 percent of those who said they wanted to become a judges at the outset of their legal education remained interested upon graduation. Salaries are the same for pomoshchniki across Russia but play out differently due to variations in the cost of living. This explains why respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg, where the cost of living is the highest in Russia, are less interested in becoming pomoshchniki than their counterparts from the hinterlands.¹⁸

Notaries. Interest in becoming a notary is low for both samples, constituting about 3 percent. The fact that relatively few respondents fall into this category might seem to contradict what I earlier said about the popularity of this specialty. In reality, it reflects the pragmatism of these law graduates. The number of notaries is controlled by the national organization and relative few new notaries are licensed are each year. Between 2006 and 2011, the last years for which we have official data, the average increase in the number of slots for notaries was 93 (Federal’naia 2012). Much as with the judicial track, new graduates become assistants or pomoshchniki to existing notaries. But their apprenticeship lasts only one year. We have no reliable information on what percentage of applicants become notaries.

Business Law Specialists. Interest in careers in business law – which includes becoming a iuriskonsul’t or a corporate lawyer – was greater among full-time students (20.6 percent) than among correspondence students (15.3 percent). The same trend is present for aspiring corporate lawyers. Given the relative newness of corporate law as a specialty, the fact

¹⁸None of the 79 zaochniki who hoped to become a judge hailed from Moscow or St. Petersburg. For full-time students, 15 percent of aspiring judges were from these cities. For the full samples of correspondence and full-time students, 13 and 32 percent, respectively, were from these cities. For both samples, most of those hoping to go on the bench were either from cities with over a million residents or from regional capitals.
that almost 7 percent of full-time students planned to seek jobs in this field is notable.\textsuperscript{19} The interest of young people in transactional law, which is a post-Soviet phenomenon in Russia, is unmistakable. So too is the propensity for these nascent business lawyers to come from Moscow or St. Petersburg. While over 30 percent of the sample of full-time students hails from Russia’s two largest cities, the percentages jump up to 40 and 53 for corporate lawyers and \textit{iuriskonsul’ty}, respectively. This is consistent with my earlier finding that lawyers outside major urban centers were unfamiliar with the possibility of building a practice on transactional law.

\textit{Undecided Graduates}. Some respondents were not ready to commit to a specialty upon graduation. As in most of Europe, Russian legal education is an undergraduate enterprise. The mean ages for our samples are 22 for full-time students and 28 for correspondence students. Not everyone is prepared to make firm (or even tentative) career decisions in their twenties.\textsuperscript{20} I was surprised that the incidence of uncertainty was higher among \textit{zaochniki} (19.7 percent) than for full-time students (13.3 percent). I had assumed that correspondence students came to the study of law with firm plans. Either this is not true or reality had thrown a wrench into their plans.

\textit{Uninterested in Legal Careers}. Less surprising is the fact that \textit{zaochniki} were more than twice as likely as full-time students to opt out of working in the legal field upon their graduation. Many correspondence students are simply seeking a university degree to give them a leg up in their job. A majority did not have law-related jobs when they entered the law \textit{fakul’tet}. They may be staying put. In addition, we have always known that a significant number of Russian law graduates never practice law in any capacity.\textsuperscript{21} Several political leaders, including Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Putin, serve as prime examples of this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{22} If I am

\textsuperscript{19}The lack of interest among correspondence students may be related to their relative inability to secure jobs in this field. As Table 2 reveals, the take-up rate for \textit{zaochniki} keen to work as corporate lawyers was 24 percent, which is less than half of the mean rate for this sample.

\textsuperscript{20}The correlation between stated preferences at the outset and conclusion of their legal education was lowest for this category. For full-time students, it was 12 percent and for correspondence students, it was 15 percent.

\textsuperscript{21}Solomon (1996, p. 343) reports that, in 1949, a third of graduates of full-time legal education ended up working as legal officials. Writing in 2017, the former vice-dean of the law \textit{fakul’tet} at Moscow State University estimates that only half of law graduates work in the legal field. His estimate includes both full-time and correspondence students (Maleshin 2017, p. 297).

\textsuperscript{22}Vladimir Lenin and Dmitrii Medvedev also graduated from law \textit{fakulty}, but both spent time practicing law before assuming political power. Lenin worked as an \textit{advokat} in Samara, and Medvedev taught law for a time at St. Petersburg State University and worked as an \textit{iuriskonsul’t} for Gazprom.
able to continue this project and re-survey these respondents periodically throughout their
careers, we will learn what happens to these defectors from the law and whether others join them.

**State versus Private Law Fakul’tety.** A second factor related to educational
choice is whether to study law at a state or private institution. Private law *fakul’tety* are a post-
Soviet phenomenon. But many state institutions of higher education that had no prior track
record in legal education took advantage of the regulatory vacuum to open law *fakul’tety.*
Put more bluntly, fly-by-night legal education can be found in both state and private law *fakul’tety.*
But Russia has yet to produce its Yale – a private university universally viewed as top-notch.
State law *fakul’tety* are uniformly regarded as more prestigious than their private brethren. To
this end, all institutions regarded as elite are state schools.

As Table 3 clarifies, full-time students were significantly more likely to opt for state law
*fakul’tety* than were correspondence students. 83.5 percent of full-time students attended a state
institution, compared with 46.3 percent of correspondence students. This table also sets out this
state-private divide for the various career preferences and reveals several intriguing patterns.
Within the criminal law specialties, aspiring *prokurory* are more likely to have attended state
*fakul’tety*, while the less ambitious respondents who were seeking lower-level jobs in this field
tended to be graduates of private *fakul’tety*. This holds true for both full-time and
correspondence students. It suggests that the connections obtained through attending higher-
ranked institutions are more essential for *prokurory*. Those who want less high-profile jobs may
only need to tick the box for a university degree; the prestige of the institution may be irrelevant.

As to others destined to work in the state sector, the desirability of connections also helps
explain the predilection of prospective judges for state law *fakul’tety*. Full-time and
correspondence students who share this goal are unified in their distaste for private institutions.
As to those who seek other jobs within the state bureaucracy, the results were mixed. *Zaochniki*
prefferred state law *fakul’tety*, but their full-time colleagues were more likely to attend private law
*fakul’tety*.  

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23 Maggs et al. (2016, p. 185) comment: “[p]ractically every manner of specialized
institute seems to have opened a law department – the Moscow State University of Geodesics
and Mapmaking to the State Academy of Oil and Gas, the Siberian University of Consumer
Cooperation, the Kislovodsk University of the Academy of Defense Industries and the Moscow
State Textile Academy.”

24 Within my sample, the *fakul’tety* coded as elite are: Moscow State University; Moscow
State Legal Academy named for O.E. Kutafin; Tomsk State University; the Higher School of
Economics, Moscow; the Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg; the Higher School of
Economics, Nizhnii Novgorod; Novosibirsk State University; Saratov Legal Academy; St.
Petersburg State University; Urals Legal Academy.
The type of connections that state law fakul'tety yield may be less important for some jobs in the private sector. For example, prospective notaries tended to be from private fakul'tety. Likewise, respondents who showed an interest in litigation but did not want to become advokaty were more likely to have attended private institutions. This trend is visible for both samples. The picture is more mixed when it comes to potential careers in transactional law. Full-time students who aspired to work as in-house counsel or as corporate lawyers flocked to state law fakul'tety. Yet the trend was just the opposite among correspondence students with similar goals. These zaochniki may have already had a foothold in the corporations where they wanted to work and just needed the sheepskin to make their leap to the next level.

As this suggests, the pedigree of a degree matters for certain employers. Corporate law firms, in particular, pay attention to where applicants studied law (Ivanov 2013). Attending a state institution already provides a leg up, but a degree from one of the elite state law fakul'tety helps even more. This was clearly more of a priority for full-time students than for zaochniki. About 18 percent of full-time students were enrolled in these schools, compared with less than 5 percent of correspondence students. Those who wanted to become advokaty and prokurory were more likely to be among this cohort. This makes sense, given that these are generally considered to be rather selective fields. The fact that those who aspire to work as in-house counsel were also more likely to attend elite schools indicates that the status of iuriskonsul'ty may be growing. More expected is the less-than-average incidence of aspiring investigators, policemen, or state bureaucrats at elite schools. These are not high-demand jobs.

Source of Payment for Legal Education. Table 3 also sets out information about how respondents paid for their legal education. Once again, the contrast between full-time and correspondence students is striking. While over a third of the former had biudzhetnye places, less than 10 percent of the latter received such state stipends.

State stipends are ostensibly awarded on the basis of merit. While some less-deserving students may obtain a biudzhetnoe place thanks to well-placed bribes, it is still fair to assume that having such a place is a marker of high achievement. With that in mind, the career choices of these top students are intriguing and unexpected. Rather than flocking to the jobs that have long enjoyed prestige, they have opted for careers that have been invented or reinvented in the post-Soviet era. For full-time students, the highest concentration of biudzhetniki are among those who aspire to become iuriskonsul'ty and who want to litigate, but without the benefit of becoming an

25While 10.75 percent of the full-time sample wanted to join the advokatura, 13.9 percent of this group attended an elite law fakul'tet. For the procuracy, these percentages were 10.9 and 13.9, respectively, and for iuriskonsul'ty, they were 13.7 and 22.5, respectively.

26While 13.7 percent of the full-time sample wanted to become sledovateli, only 9.4 percent of this group attended an elite law fakul'tet. For other jobs in the field of criminal justice, these percentages were 3.1 and 1.5, respectively, and for state lawyers, they were 7.9 and 3.75, respectively.
advokat. The former job was the worst nightmare for Soviet-era law graduates and the latter was not even dreamt of. By contrast, working in the criminal justice system, which would have been an appealing option in the past, attracted comparatively few of these high achievers. This speaks to the fundamental shifts in the legal services marketplace in post-Soviet Russia.

Respondents who did not receive funding from the state had to find other funding sources. Very few (6.7 percent) full-time students paid their own way. The youth of this cohort left them mostly reliant on their parents. By contrast, over two-thirds of zaochniki shouldered the tuition burden themselves. A strong association is evident between age and payment strategies. The older cohort of correspondence students were more likely to have paid their own tuition. For example, the average age for those who wanted to work as corporate lawyers, non-advokat litigators, or in the criminal justice field (but not as a prokuror or sledovatel') was above that for zaochniki as a group, and they emerge as more likely to have assumed financial responsibility. This link makes sense. Older students have had more time to amass a nest egg and are more likely to have struck out on their own.

Gender. Women have struggled to gain a foothold in the legal profession in many countries. In his 2012 article, Ethan Michelson meticulously documents the increasing feminization of the legal profession, which he describes as a “widespread but not universal global phenomenon” of the 21st century (p. 1074). He concludes that, by 2010, almost 36 percent of the world’s lawyers were women (p. 1094). But in his work on China, he cautions that “[t]he global feminization of legal professions . . . has not leveled the playing field for men and women lawyers. Although employment opportunities for women lawyers around the world have greatly expanded quantitatively, their careers remain qualitatively less successful than those of their male counterparts” (Michelson 2009, p. 365).

The Russian story began differently, but ends up in much the same place. Women joined the Soviet workforce in large numbers following the 1917 Revolution (Lapidus 1978). The legal arena was no exception. In his 1977 monograph on the career preferences of young people in Siberia, David Konstantinovskii (1977, p. 143) found that becoming a iurist was a more common dream for girls. Feminization within most legal specialties was a 20th century reality. But Michelson’s cautionary note about China applied to the Soviet Union as well. Increases in numbers did not indicate an enhanced stature for women. Many have argued just the opposite, namely that having large numbers of women in a particular job was a reliable indicator of low status in the Soviet Union (Hendley 1996; Ginsburgs 1985). Whether this endures in the post-Soviet era is less clear. What does seem to persist is the tendency for women to be segregated in low level legal jobs.

Table 4 provides a snapshot of the gender breakdown of each legal specialty for the respondents at the outset of their careers. Recall that the sample of full-time students included 35.5 percent men and 64.5 percent women that, for correspondence students, the sample was composed of 37.9 percent men and 62.1 percent women. Of interest to us are specialties for which the gender split for either or both samples are significantly different.
**Judges.** Most notable in this regard are aspiring judges. For both samples, over 80 percent of this group were women. Those of us schooled in the U.S., where female judges remain the exception rather than the rule, might be surprised by this result. But, as I noted earlier, women have long been a fixture on the bench in Russia. They were estimated to make up about a third of the judicial corps from 1974-1985 (Ginsburgs 1985, p. 308). In 1990, on the eve of the transition, 44 percent of trial-level judges were women. Echoing my earlier point about how women rarely rose to the top, the percentage of women decreased to 37 for appellate courts and 22 for the supreme courts of the republics that made up the Soviet Union (Narodnoe 1991, p. 258). Although the presence of women on the bench was often touted by Soviet leaders as an indicator of gender equality under Communism, Ginsburgs argues just the opposite. He sees it as an indicator of the low status of judges in the Soviet Union.

With a few exceptions, the indigenous ethos does not exalt womanhood and public opinion will count the presence of female judges more as a minus than a plus in rating the stature of the department. Besides, the commoner has a tendency to project his own values into others, especially his superiors, and so he is prone to conclude that if the leaders assign women to the judiciary in wholesale lots, this *per se* is a sign of their low regard for the institution. In such cozy company, circular reasoning runs as follows: the people in charge would not entrust that job to women if they thought it was important; and the fact that the task is routinely allocated to women proves that it cannot be important (1985, p. 309).

In post-Soviet Russia, women have come to dominate the bench in ever greater numbers. By 2014, almost 65 percent of Russian judges were women (Volkov et al. 2016, p. 87). As before, they are more likely to be trial judges than appellate judges. When I ask Russian judges about the disproportionate number of women, they are usually puzzled by the question. To them, women are temperamentally better suited for the bench; they are better able to manage the heavy workload. Volkov and Dzmitryieva found their judicial interlocutors to be more circumspect, but came to the same conclusion. They quote a male judge who reported difficulties in retaining

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27 The robust representation of women was duplicated in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Reflecting on this, Zdeněk Kühn wrote: “it might be said that the percentage of women on the bench was in direct reverse proportion to the general level of prestige enjoyed by the profession. In the countries where the judiciary enjoys a high prestige, i.e., common law system or Germany, the number of female judges is traditionally much lower. In contrast, the countries with much less prestigious judicial professions, typically the countries of the Romanist legal circle (e.g., France and Italy), achieved gender balance, or even gender imbalance in favor of women, similar to the ex-socialist systems” (Kühn 2004, p. 550).

28 The survey found that women constituted 69.6 percent of all justices of the peace, 64.8 percent of district court judges, 56.6 percent of judges of regional courts, and 35.7 percent of Russian Supreme Court judges (Volkov et al. 2016, p. 90).
male staff members. He told them that men “fled very quickly to work as assistants to a prosecutor, because the salary there was higher, and they could not bear the pace here” (Volkov & Dzmitryeva 2015, p. 177). This same sentiment applies to judges themselves. They found that, as new opportunities for the legally trained presented themselves in the 1990s, male judges were more likely to jump ship in search of better salaries whereas women sought stability and stayed put (Volkov et al. 2016).

Recent surveys of judges document that, as between the different sources of judges, women are more likely to emerge from the pool of former courthouse personnel than from the pool of former prosecutors. As to the former, almost 84 percent were women, whereas as to the latter, slightly less than half were women. Outside of these two groups, under a third were women (Volkov & Dzmitryeva 2015, p. 173). With that as background, it makes more sense that more than 80 percent of the 2016 law graduates surveyed who want to join the bench were women.

**Notaries.** As with judges, women predominate the ranks of notarial offices. In the waning years of the Soviet Union, 85 percent of notaries were women (Narodnoe 1991, p. 258). Writing about notaries in Eastern Europe under Communist control, Shaw (2004, p. 147) comments that female domination was regarded as “natural” because the job was considered to be at “the bottom of the hierarchy of legal professions.” To this end, Lempert (1986, p. 1182), quotes a male lawyer on notaries in the late 1980s: “This is women’s work because it demands attention to detail.” He tells us that women notaries took no offense at this assessment and, in fact, agreed with it.

As I noted above, reforms in the post-Soviet era privatized notarial functions. Shaw speculates that as the prestige and pay of notaries increased, the job might become more appealing to men (Shaw 2004, p. 147). In countries with longstanding capitalist traditions, such as Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the tables are turned and men constitute 80 percent or more of all notaries (ibid.). To date, however, women notaries remain the rule in Russia. In 2011, women still made up 85 percent of all notaries (Federal’naia 2012).

The results for the survey of recent law graduates are entirely consistent with this tradition of female domination. Over 70 percent of those who aspire to become notaries were women. No one has yet undertaken a thorough scholarly analysis of why notaries tend to be women in Russia.

**Criminal Justice Specialties.** Table 4 tells a different story for prokurory, sledovateli, and other jobs in the criminal justice sphere. As to prokurory, a minor gender bias is visible, but only among zaochniki. While women make up 62 percent of this sample, almost 67

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29 The same is true in many East European countries. For example, under Communism, two-thirds of Polish notaries were women (Shaw 2004). In 1998, 63.3 percent were women (Fuszara 2003).
percent of correspondence students who chose this career path were women. This higher level of interest among women \textit{zaochniki} is intriguing because it stands at odds with our limited information about gender attitudes within the \textit{procuratura}. In a 2010 interview, the Deputy Russian Procurator General, Aleksandr Zviagintsev, described the work of \textit{procurory} as “tense” (naprezhennaiia) and noted that “some cannot withstand it” (ne vyderzhivaiut). In his view, this is why men outnumber women by an approximate ratio of 60 to 40 (Interv’iu 2010). Why women would want to join a service that questions their fitness is a puzzle that deserves further investigation.

The results for criminal investigators are different for full-time and part-time students. As to \textit{zaochniki}, no gender effect is visible. The percentages for \textit{sledovateli} aspirants mirror those of the overall sample. But among full-time students, men are more interested in this career than are women. Almost 44 percent of those interested in becoming \textit{sledovateli} were men which outpaces the 35.5 percent of men in this sample. The lower-than-average interest among female respondents is more surprising. According to Kirill Titaev and Maria Shklairuk, the profession of investigator in Russia has “a woman’s face” (2016, p. 120). Their research indicates that over 70 percent of \textit{sledovateli} are women (ibid.). They do not speculate on why women tend to dominate this career field. Precisely why women full-time students who participated in my survey were disinclined to opt for careers as investigators is likewise obscure.

The findings are most striking for the third “other”category, which often means becoming a police officer. Women respondents were significantly less represented among both full-time and correspondence students who aspired to these jobs. But there are still grounds for optimism. Given that women make up only 20 percent of the Russian police force (Bragina & Jones 2017), the survey results are higher than expected. The leadership of the Russian police have long promised to work towards greater gender diversity, though scholars of the Russian police remain skeptical (Semukhina and Reynolds 2013, pp. 150-1). Perhaps this new generation’s choices reflect progress on that score.

\textit{Litigation Specialists.} The percentage of women who chose litigation specialties – either \textit{advokaty} or non-\textit{advokaty} litigators – was significantly above the average only for the sample of correspondence students. For full-time students, the gender ratios for aspiring litigators was basically the same as for the sample as a whole. Making sense of these data is complicated by the lack of data for non-\textit{advokaty} litigators. As to \textit{advokaty}, their national organization reports a gender split that was similar to that for \textit{prokurory}. In 2015, 41 percent of \textit{advokaty} were women (Otchet 2015). This seems to represent backsliding for women since the Soviet era.\footnote{Huskey (1982, p. 32) reminds us that women were not permitted to practice as \textit{advokaty} under the tsars. He credits the Provisional Government with passing legislation in March 1917 that opened the door to women. The Provisional Government came to power in February 1917 after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and remained in control until the October Revolution of 1917.} By 1990, women constituted a majority (51 percent) of \textit{advokaty} (Narodnoe 1991,
This reflected substantial increase from their 29 percent share in 1975 (Jordan 2005, p. 40). But in her monograph on advokaty, Pamela Jordan suggests that the gains of the perestroika era were ephemeral. She argued that more men than women left the advokatura in the late 1980s in pursuit of higher salaries when the barriers on practicing as a non-advokat dissipated (ibid., p. 54). This would have inflated the percentage of women. The 2015 data may reflect the return of these men to the folds of the advokatura.

My interest lies more in the present-day reality than in the twists and turns of the history of gender representation among advokaty. The willingness of a higher-than-average number (73 percent) of female zaochniki to throw their hats into the ring of the advokatura indicates that they see a future for themselves. Of course, the lack of any gender effect for full-time students suggests that not all women agree. If I am able to field regular surveys over the next few decades among my current respondents, we will be able to assess whether women are flourishing in this field. The comparative literature shows that women tend to leave the legal workforce in greater numbers for a variety of reasons, including family demands and implicit gender bias (e.g., Michelson 2009; Reichman & Sterling 2004). This pattern has been confirmed in both capitalist and communist settings. Whether it is true in Russia remains to be seen.

Business Law Specialists. Women law graduates, both full-time and correspondence students, were more favorably disposed toward business law specialties than were men. As I noted earlier, corporate law is a new practice area in Russia. As a result, we know nothing about the makeup of the current cohort of corporate law specialists. In countries with a longer history of corporate law practice, women have not dominated this specialty. For example, in U.S. law firms, most of which concentrate on serving corporate clients, women made up only 18 percent of equity partners, as compared with 45 percent of associates in 2016 (American Bar Association 2017). Among these partners, there is a 44 percent pay gap in favor of men (Olson 2016). Given that many of the Russian firms that specialize in transactional work are outposts of Western law firms, it is unlikely that the situation is different in Russia. Whether freshly minted law graduates are aware of what awaits them is unclear. In contrast to the U.S., the potential for gender bias in law firms is not regularly addressed by the Russian media.

We know more about the gender breakdown for iuriskonsul’ty. In the Soviet era, the position of iuriskonsul’t did not enjoy high status. Even more problematic was their lack of job security. Unlike most Soviet workers, who were notoriously difficult to fire (Hendley 1996; McAuley 1969), the tenure of iuriskonsul’ty depended on staying in the good graces of the general director (Shelley 1984, p. 46). All of this added up to a workplace where women were

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31Women hold leadership positions in only 22 of 83 regional organizations of advokaty (Otchet 2015). They were likewise poorly represented within the Soviet-era leadership of the advokatura (Jordan 2005, p. 40)
commonplace.\textsuperscript{32} Little changed in the transition era.\textsuperscript{33} In a 1997 survey of over 300 industrial enterprises on which I collaborated with several economists, we found that almost 60 percent of all enterprises with legal departments were headed by women (Hendley et al. 2001, p. 695).\textsuperscript{34} We did not see this as evidence of female empowerment. Just the opposite: “[t]he feminization of legal departments only served to confirm their low status” (ibid.). Thus, the relative popularity among female respondents of becoming \textit{iuriskonsul’ty} was to be expected. Whether it reflects a continuation of this ghetto-ization of women or marks a new era is not clear from these data.

\textit{Attitudes toward Judicial Independence}. Just as interesting as the demographic trends for the various career paths is the question of whether there is any systematic variation in respondents’ attitudes towards the Russian legal system based on their job choices. One of the survey questions went to the heart of their assessment of judicial independence in Russia. Respondents were given the following two statements and asked which best reflected their point of view:

- Judges in Russia are basically independent from representatives of federal and local power.
- Judges in Russia are basically under the control of representatives of federal and local power.

Respondents who were uncomfortable responding were allowed to opt out. The results for each sample, broken down by career preference, are set forth in Table 5.

As a general matter, correspondence students were more optimistic about the courts than were their full-time colleagues. This holds true not just for the two samples as a whole, but also for each of the career options with a single exception. In an odd twist, \textit{zaochniki} who hope to become judges are lukewarm at best about the capacity of the courts to resist outside pressure. The reasons why are not immediately apparent. The responses of full-time students who want to go onto the bench make more sense. Their confidence in the upstandingness of their future

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Career Option & Judges are Independent & Judges are Under Control \\
\hline
Correspondence & 76\% & 24\% \\
Full-Time & 62\% & 38\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{32}Shelley’s monograph on Soviet \textit{iuriskonsul’ty} was grounded in interviews with emigres. This limited her ability to generalize about the demographic makeup of the population of \textit{iuriskonsul’ty}. She argued that the size of the enterprise mattered. “Whereas most of the senior lawyers employed in major economic enterprises are male, a large share of the lawyers employed in social, cultural, and educational organizations are female, reflecting the lesser prestige accorded to those who work in these areas” (1984, p. 121).

\textsuperscript{33}The Soviet pattern was replicated in its East European satellite states and persisted well after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In Poland, the percentage of female \textit{iuriskonsul’ty} held steady at around 49 percent from 1991 to 1999 (Fuszara 2003, p. 384).

\textsuperscript{34}This Russian reality stands in contrast to the situation for in-house counsel in the U.S. In 2016, slightly less than a quarter of the general counsels for Fortune 500 were women (American Bar Association 2017). This represents a substantial increase from 2000, when only 9 percent of these lawyers were women (American Bar Association n.d.).
coworkers significantly outpaces that of adherents to other career paths.

This pattern is not limited to judges. More generally, a cleavage in attitudes is observable between those who intended to work for the state and those who planned to go into private practice. Along with judges, those who are destined to work in the criminal justice system and the state bureaucracy were more likely to believe in the independence of the courts. By contrast, most of those who hoped to work with private clients were openly suspicious of the courts, fearing that they would bend to the will of politicians. Such findings would not be a surprise among experienced legal professionals. We would expect those who are called upon to challenge the state regularly, such as advokaty, to grow cynical over time. By the same token, veteran state workers would be expected to become defensive about the institutions where they work. What is more unexpected is that graduating law students, who were not differentiated by their future specialties in their classes, would naturally divide themselves in this way. It suggests that, rather than learning their pro- or anti-state attitudes on the job, they arrived at law fakul’tety with these mindsets.

Yet their time studying law left its mark. Respondents’ attitudes towards judicial independence diverge sharply from those of Russian society at large. The question I asked them replicates a question included on a nationally representative survey fielded in 2008 by INDEM, a Moscow public policy institute. Less than 20 percent of those surveyed by INDEM agreed that judges are basically independent from outside pressure. Almost 60 percent took the opposite position; they saw judges as being under the thumb of federal and local officials. The remaining 20 percent refused to take a position. The opinions of the youth surveyed as part of this project were much the same. This hints at the success of the process of socializing law students into the profession – the views of my respondents differ significantly from those of their generational cohort. The results of the INDEM survey hue more closely to the common wisdom about courts than do the views of the surveyed law students. Public opinion polling consistently shows low levels of trust in the courts. Although many assume that these distrustful Russians will avoid the courts (Dawisha 2014), the use of courts has been on a steady upward trajectory since the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is not to say that Russians flock to courts. Like people

35 Respondents who indicated a desire to become non-advokaty litigators were the exception for both full-time and correspondence students. Precisely why is unclear. For both samples, the number of students who fall into this category was rather small. It was 16 for full-time students and 52 for zaochniki.

36 Among respondents in the INDEM survey born after 1988, 18 percent said judges were independent; 55 percent said they were not independent; and 27 percent expressed no opinion.

37 The Levada Center has annually fielded surveys about trust in institutions, including courts. Between 1993 and 2016, the level of full trust in courts has fluctuated between less than 10 percent to almost 30 percent. In 2016, 22 percent of surveyed Russians expressed complete trust in courts (Levada Center 2016).
elsewhere, Russians resort to litigation only when all efforts at negotiated settlement have failed. The point here is that, notwithstanding their professed low regard for the courts, using them when necessary is considered a viable option (Hendley 2017)

The contrast between the views of ordinary Russians and law students is remarkable. As a group, both full-time and correspondence students were more than twice as likely to express confidence in the capacity and willingness of Russian judges to stand up to political actors than were Russians without legal education. They were also markedly less likely to refuse to express an opinion on this score. Both of these findings can be at least partially explained by the very fact that the surveyed students have been enmeshed in the study of the legal system for four years. Unlike average Russians, for most of whom courts are remote, law students study the courts carefully. The pedagogical predilection for lecturing, which encourages students to accept the professors’ words as gospel, and to emphasize the law on the books over the law in action combine to create a generally positive image of the courts. This teaching style leaves few opportunities for students to challenge their teachers.

I wondered whether actual experience with the courts would make a difference. About a quarter of the respondents had spent time in the courts, either as part of clinical programs or in connection with an experiential learning component of the curriculum. Interestingly, those who had this hands-on knowledge of the courts were more sanguine about their independence than were their counterparts who had never been to court. These court veterans might have emerged from their experiences with more empathy for the complexity of the court’s tasks and, as a result, were less judgmental (see Table 5).

**Preliminary Conclusions and Next Steps**

Research on the criminal justice system has long hypothesized a common worldview among judges and the legal professionals who are responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases. But we have never truly understood the roots of this commonality. Scholars of Soviet (Solomon 1987) and post-Soviet criminal justice (Khodzhaeva and Rabovski 2016; Paneyakh et al. 2010) have argued that this so-called accusatorial bias is a response to institutional incentives that reward convictions and penalize acquittals. In a system that is ostensibly aimed at uncovering the truth, innocence should be uncovered during the investigatory stage, not at trial. The guilt of indicted defendants is presumed, at least informally. Acquittals are, therefore, viewed as a misuse of state resources to be avoided. The number of acquittals is tracked and this statistic influences the chances for career advancement of all involved. As a practical matter, this system unites judges, prosecutors, investigators, and police in a common enterprise aimed at ensuring conviction that puts advokaty outside the pale. Some argue that many advokaty are coopted; that those who rely on court appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants go along in order to ensure continued good favor (Khodzhaeva 2016). But the hypothesis that this unity of purpose is a response to the desire for career success implicitly assumes that it is learned on the job.
But my data push the story in a different direction. The relationship between respondents’ openness to the existence of judicial independence in post-Soviet Russia and their post-graduation career plans documents a strong association between these two factors. Those involved in the criminal justice system share a strong belief in the capacity of the courts to act independently. Advokaty, by contrast, are markedly more skeptical. It is notable that this association has arisen before most of them have begun work in earnest. The difference between those who plan to work in the criminal justice system (including judges) and aspiring advokaty is already evident upon their graduation from the law fakul’tet. At this point, however, the evidence is only suggestive. The next step is to bore in on this question to analyze the extent to which the career choices of Russian law graduates is being driven by their trust in the capacity of the courts to act independently and, more fundamentally, to provide justice.

Apart from the attitudinal variation between respondents headed for state jobs and those who are keen for private practice, the numerical breakdown between these two sectors is remarkable. Recall that less than three decades ago, almost all Russian legal specialists were employed by the state. Only advokaty were not state workers, but even they could not escape the tentacles of the Communist Party, which was more or less coterminous with the state. The results for the surveyed 2016 law fakul’tet graduates reflect a sea change. Although a majority of respondents who plan to practice law are destined for state jobs, private practice has become much more common. Once again, the two samples diverge. Table 6 summarizes the data for respondents who shared their desired career plans. Close to half (46.7) of full-time students expressed a preference for private practice, making it increasingly the rule rather than the exception for this cohort. Correspondence students were more conventional. About 60 percent planned to work for the state in some capacity. This shift speaks not only to the impact of the market transition, which transformed iuriskonsul’ty and notaries from the state sector to the private sector, but also to the introduction of new career paths, such as becoming a corporate lawyer. The differences between the two samples suggests that zaochniki may be more limited in their career opportunities.

These trends put into question the relative attractiveness of the possible career paths open to Russian law graduates. There seems little doubt that the prestige of many specialties is in flux. In terms of sheer numbers, a preference for criminal justice is dominant. But these tend to be students without state fellowships who have attending the less prestigious private law fakul’tety and/or have completed a correspondence degree. By contrast, working as a iuriskonsul’t, which had been a last-ditch alternative for graduates in the decades of Soviet power and during the immediate transition of the 1990s, now seems to be popular among high flyers. Careers in corporate law or as a non-advokat litigator, both of which are new possibilities for Russians, are similarly popular among the biudzhetniki, who were marked as the best among their cohorts. Becoming a notary, which the secondary literature indicated had grown in appeal with its post-Soviet privatization, was greeted with less enthusiasm by respondents.

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38 On the challenges to the independence of the advokatura, see Bocharov and Moiseeva (2016); Jordan (2005).
On the other hand, the associations between gender and career choice revealed by the data largely follows the predictions of the secondary literature. Women respondents aspired to careers as judges, notaries, and in-house counsel, reflecting longstanding traditions in Russia. Men were more likely to opt for careers in criminal justice. More intriguing is the extent to which respondents will stick with these jobs over the long run and whether, as in other countries, this attrition will vary by gender. Subsequent surveys ought to shed light on this.

Without doubt, the strongest link with career choice is full-time versus correspondence education, confirming our original intuition that these two groups need to be studied separately. As we have seen, these two groups diverge on many scores. This one marker denotes profound differences in socio-economic background and age which, in turn, influence the opportunities open to respondents. Zaochniki, many of whom were footing the bill for their education by holding down jobs while studying law, tended to enroll in lower-prestige private fakul’tety. This colored their options upon graduation. They are more likely to pursue jobs in the state sector. Given that they are older and more experienced than their full-time colleagues, the fact that these correspondence students were more likely to be uncertain of their next steps upon graduation is puzzling and worthy of further investigation.

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Table 1: Summary statistics for surveyed graduating Russian law students (results presented as percentages of each sample, not including those who did not respond).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-Time Students</th>
<th>Correspondence Students</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Gender:
  Men                                        | 36                | 37.3                   |
  Women                                       | 64                | 62.7                   |
| Marital status:
  Never married                              | 84.6              | 42.5                   |
  Married                                     | 5.2               | 38.5                   |
  Living together                              | 9.5               | 11.8                   |
  Divorced                                    | 0.7               | 7.2                    |
| Geographic distribution:
  Moscow or St. Petersburg                    | 32.2              | 12.8                   |
  Other European regions                       | 39.9              | 58.2                   |
  Siberia and the Far East                     | 11.7              | 15.2                   |
  Urals                                       | 15.5              | 11.2                   |
  North Caucasus                              | 4.7               | 2.7                    |
| Type of legal education:
  State                                       | 82.8              | 45.9                   |
  Private                                     | 17.2              | 54.1                   |
| Attended law *fakul'tet* in home region      | 63.5              | 75.2                   |
| Activities before studying law:
  High school                                 | 92.1              | 34.7                   |
  Studied in different department              | 2.1               | 9.6                    |
  Member of work force                         | 5.8               | 55.7                   |
| Mean age                                     | 22.1              | 28.1                   |
| Both parents are university graduates         | 43.6              | 24.4                   |
| Family’s financial situation:
  Poor: family had trouble covering the cost of basic necessities | 13.6 | 16.4 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower middle class: family had enough money for essentials, but had to save for big-ticket items</th>
<th>Upper middle class: family could buy big-ticket items, but not cars</th>
<th>Rich: family had no financial worries</th>
<th>Identify as ethnic Russian</th>
<th>Spiritual affiliation of believers:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>(n=1495)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(n=604)</td>
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<td>70.1</td>
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<td>Muslim</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>Does not belong to established religion</td>
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</table>
Table 2: Career preferences and success in finding jobs among surveyed Russian law graduates (reported as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Choice</th>
<th>Full-time Students</th>
<th>Correspondence Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Career Choice</td>
<td>Had secured job*†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advokat</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Advokat Litigator</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice – general**</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iuriskonsul’t</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate lawyer</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer for state</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notary</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not lawyer</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Chi²=0
* As percentage of those who chose that specialty, within each sample.
** Those who plan to work within the criminal justice system, but not as a prokurator or investigator.
Table 3: Type of legal educational institution attended and funding for higher education among surveyed Russian law graduates (reported as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Educational Institution</th>
<th>Full-time Students</th>
<th>Correspondence Students</th>
<th>Method of Paying for Education*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>46.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advokat</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Adv Litigator</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>Criminal justice – general**</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iuriskonsul't</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<td>Corporate lawyer</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyer for state</td>
<td>79.3</td>
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<td>71.9</td>
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<td>Notary</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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*Funding methods: State, Parents, Self.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>80.6</th>
<th>19.4</th>
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<tr>
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<td>80.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* About 2 percent of each sample funded their education using other sources.

** Those who plan to work within the criminal justice system, but not as a prokurator or investigator.
Table 4: Gender distribution for surveyed Russian law graduates (reported as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-time Students</th>
<th>Correspondence Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advokat</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Advokat Litigator</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice – general*</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iuriskonsul’t</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate lawyer</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer for state</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notary</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not lawyer</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Those who plan to work within the criminal justice system, but not as a prokurator or investigator.
Table 5: Attitudes regarding the capacity of Russian courts for independence among the surveyed Russian law graduates (reported as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-time students</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Correspondence students</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Independent*</td>
<td>Dependent**</td>
<td>No response</td>
<td>Independent*</td>
<td>Dependent**</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advokat</td>
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<td>52.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Advokat Litigator</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>42.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice – general***</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iuriskonsul’t</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
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<td>40.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporate lawyer</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50.5</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer for state</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>51.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
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<td>43.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not lawyer</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample if respondents had court experience</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.424</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample if respondents lacked court experience</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Judges in Russia are basically independent from representatives of federal and local power.
** Judges in Russia are basically under the control of representatives of federal and local power.
*** Those who plan to work within the criminal justice system, but not as a prokurator or investigator.
Table 6: Division of surveyed Russian law graduates into those planning to work for the state and those planning to go into private practice (reported as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of job desired:</th>
<th>Full-time students</th>
<th>Correspondence students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State sector (procurator, investigator, criminal justice – general,* lawyer for state, judge)</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private practice (advokat, non-advokat litigator, iuriskonsul’t, corporate lawyer, notary)</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>411</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi1</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Those who plan to work within the criminal justice system, but not as a prokurator or investigator.